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I. INTRODUCTION 
What do Francois Hollande, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jacques Chirac, Francois 
Mitterrand and Georges Pompidou, the last five French presidents, have in com-
mon?1 What is the smallest common denominator between twelve of the previous 
Prime Ministers of the French Republic?2 The short answer is Sciences Po: the 
elite French School of Public Affairs that has been training all the top French poli-
ticians since World War II. All the different generations of French political lead-
ers have met for the first time on Sciences Po’s benches, and most of them have 
formed their more solid friendship and network relationship by that time. This has 
led to harsh criticism against friendship connection and homophily among the 
leaders ruling the country. 
This anecdotal example raises a broader research question on the role of 
friends and social networks in beliefs formation. How does social networks influ-
ence political opinions? What determines the speed of convergence or the persis-
tence of disagreement among friends, and what are the mechanisms behind it? 
While there has been extensive research on how leaders and group of people may 
influence voting behavior,3 or on the impact of media exposure and persuasion on 
turn-out and political opinions,4 the role of social networks and friends on politi-
cal opinion has received less attention. In a seminal theoretical paper, Golub and 
Jackson (2012) analyze how the speed of convergence of agents’ beliefs depends 
                                                 
1
 If your answer is womanizer, you got it wrong… Georges Pompidou was not.  
2
 Dominique de Villepin, Lionel Jospin, Alain Juppé, Edouard Balladur, Michel Rocard, Laurent Fabius, Raymond Barre, 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Maurice Couve de Merville, and Michel Debré, in addition to Jacques Chirac and Georges Pom-
pidou.  
3
 See e.g. Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010), Gabel and Scheve (2007), Carlsson et al. (2015). 
4
 See e.g. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007), Gentzkow (2006), Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson (2011), Kendall, Nannicini 
and Trebbi (2015), Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009). 
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on network structure in a model with homophily to explain the persistence of seg-
regation and persistence in disagreement. But this study has not led to empirical 
identification, due to the lack of observational studies where the social network 
formation is exogenous and not plagued by sorting and reflection problem. In a 
seminal non-experimental study, Lazarfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944) found 
that US voters in the 1940 Presidential election were more influenced by friends 
than mass media. More recent empirical papers exploit online networks such as 
Facebook to measure social contagion of messages (Bond et al., 2012) on political 
mobilization and turn-out, but without identifying the impact of friends’ political 
beliefs. 
This paper addresses this issue by exploiting the near ideal natural exper-
iment of Sciences Po to provide causal evidence of the role of friends in political 
opinion and behaviors. While most of the top political leaders meet each other and 
start their political enrollment at Sciences Po, an administrative curiosity has re-
cently introduced a source of exogeneity in the building of their friendship rela-
tionships by randomly assigning students into tutorial classes for the first year 
courses. We exploit this random assignment policy by performing a survey for the 
first-year student who have entered Sciences Po in early September 2013, and ask 
incentive-compatible questions to elicit their social networks (as, for example, in 
Leider et al., 2009, 2010). Students were asked to provide a list of friends and 
were rewarded if friends provide cross-validated answers to a few questions. We 
also surveyed students’ political opinions over time, and behaviors in latest na-
tional and local elections, and students’ opinions on key policy issues such as 
immigration policy. We then examine the diffusion and convergence of political 
opinions within social networks by using the panel of all pairs of students and by 
estimating dyadic regression of differences in beliefs on friendship.   
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Naturally the main traditional concern in such regression is reverse causal-
ity and correlation in unobservables due to homophily: people have proclivities to 
link to others similar to themselves, both on observed and unobserved characteris-
tics that could influence their behavior (Manski, 1993; McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook, 2001; Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009). As a result, the OLS estimate 
of the role of friendship in beliefs formation might be upward biased since people 
tend to be similar. They tend to form friendship relationships with individuals 
who originally share their political opinions. We address this concern by using an 
instrument for friendship formation based on the initial exogenous allocation of 
Sciences Po students into small tutorial groups at school entry. During the first 
year, students are asked to follow common introductory courses in economics, 
history, sociology, political science and law. Those core courses are constituted 
by one weekly lecture that groups the whole cohort (800 students) and by com-
pulsory weekly tutorials that group together about twenty students each and where 
most of the social interactions across students take place. In order to enhance fur-
ther social links among first-year students who come from all over France and 
from abroad, the administration has chosen few years ago to link tutorials together 
into packs. Students are assigned the same classmates across all the subjects with 
whom they have at least three meetings together each week during the tutorials, 
and common free time for homework and group projects.  
The group membership for the tutorials is thus by far the first place within 
the institution where first year students interact together. By exploiting our 2014 
survey, we find a very strong relationship between common group membership 
and friendship: being in the same group increases the chance of a pair of students 
to become friends by 35 percentage points. Common group membership alone 
explains about 15% of the variation in pairwise undirected friendships across dy-
ads, whereas alternative control variables could explain only 1.6% more. Im-
portantly, the assignment to these tutorials is exogenous with respect to the stu-
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dents’ characteristics. We describe at length in the paper the exogeneity of the 
assignment procedure: it takes place at school entry, when the overwhelming ma-
jority of students do not know each other, and the enrolment process does not 
provide neither time nor information for any coordination among students. We 
then give additional statistical tests by regressing dyadic model of group for-
mation on the initial characteristics of the members of the dyad, and show the 
absence of any statistically significant characteristics. We then provide several 
additional tests to show that group membership to tutorials is thus a valid instru-
ment for friendship formation.  
We next estimate the causal impact of friends on beliefs formation by us-
ing group membership as an instrument. The IV strategy is based on local average 
treatment effect (LATE) among compliers, which is among those who become 
friend only due to the group assignment. We find very strong first stage estimates 
and check that the exclusion restriction, that common membership does not affect 
opinions through other channels, is respected. The second-stage estimates of the 
impact of undirected friendship imply an average convergence in political opinion 
among first-year friends. The magnitude of the convergence is quite substantial: 
around 0.16 points over a scale from 1 to 10 in political opinions, which accounts 
for 11% of the standard deviation. The magnitude is unchanged with the exclu-
sion of pre-Sciences Po difference in political opinion, suggesting that the IV es-
timates properly address the previous issue of homophily.  
Besides, we show that convergence in political opinion happens only 
among friends, while the effect would be insignificant if we were focusing on 
pairs of non-friends belonging to the same group. This finding is important with 
respect to the literature on peer effects since what really matters in social learning 
or imitation is not peers, but friends. Moreover, friends not only converge in polit-
ical beliefs, but also in behaviors: pairs of friends significantly converge in their 
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associative lives and among those who do enroll in a political party; a pair of 
friends becomes more likely to enroll in the same political party.  
We next analyze potential heterogeneous effects to analyze the mecha-
nisms and channels behind this convergence process. A first important finding is 
that convergence is higher among students with more initial differences in politi-
cal attitudes. This is in line with DeGroot model of convergence (DeGroot, 1974; 
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel, 2003; Golub, and Jackson, 2010, 2012).  The 
second important finding is that the network structure plays a key role. Conver-
gence mostly takes place among direct friends, while the convergence decays with 
second-order direct friends.  
We also find that convergence works partly thanks to common friends: 
convergence is higher when more common friends hold opinion in between. Strik-
ingly, people’s beliefs converge towards the beliefs of stars, which are the stu-
dents who have the highest network centrality (in terms of betweenness and ei-
genvector centrality). To put it differently, those who are the most likely to 
change their political opinions are those who are the least central. This finding 
suggests that imitation or leadership is the main driver in the formation of politi-
cal attitudes, rather than acquisition of information or social learning. The third 
main heterogeneous effect is related to extremists: while there is a stronger con-
vergence in beliefs among friends with opposite political priors, in contrast there 
is a divergence among students who share initially extreme left priors.  
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the 
literature on peers, social networks and social learning. Section 3 describes the 
data and analyzes the exogenous allocation process of students across groups at 
school entry. Section 4 details the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the base-
line results and Section 6 studies the heterogeneous effects. The role of the struc-
ture of the social network is analyzed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Although our paper provides a novel analysis of the role of social net-
works on political belief formation, there has been an extensive literature on the 
impact of peers and social networks on other beliefs and behaviors. We discuss 
below the main identification issues raised in this literature and how we address 
them in this paper. 
II.A. Peer Effects 
There is an important literature on peer effects. This literature looks at the 
causal impact of peers on different outcomes and mainly uses field experiments 
(see e.g. Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003).5 
For example, Boisjoly et al. (2006) show that the racial composition of 
freshman housing assignments can have a long run impact on student attitudes. 
They show that, if a student is randomly assigned to a black roommate, he/she is 
somewhat more likely to support Affirmative Action in admissions and societal 
income redistribution.  
Other interesting peer-effect studies include that of Sacerdote (2001) and 
Carrell et al. (2009) who analyze specific contexts in which first-year roommates 
(or hallmates or squadron mates in the case of military academies) are randomly 
assigned by the housing office. This creates exogenous variation in one's peer 
group, which is then used to ask how much peers matter, which peers matter, and 
for what outcomes. They find strong peer effects in education. A recent paper by 
Carrell et al. (2013) examines squadron mates in the case of military academies. 
They manipulate the groups by putting together low-ability and high-ability in-
coming cadets at the US Air Force Academy. They show that performance for the 
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 For an overview of this literature, see Sacerdote (2011, 2014). 
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lower-ability students fell relative to lower-ability students in the randomly as-
signed control group. 
Compared to this literature, we study network rather than peer effects. In-
deed, peer effects are usually conceived as an average intra-group externality that 
affects identically all the members of a given group. For example, in the example 
above, all cadets affected to the same squadron are considered as peers. This 
means that the group boundaries for such a homogeneous effect are often arbi-
trary, and at a quite aggregate level, in part due to the constraints imposed by the 
available disaggregated data. For instance, in standard peer effect papers (such as 
Angrist and Lavy, 1999), peer effects are measured at the school or the classroom 
level using average school achievements. In this paper, we focus on the smallest 
unit of analysis for peer effects, that is the dyad, a two-person group. The collec-
tion of active bilateral influences or dyads constitutes a social network. In our 
dataset, this means that the reference group (or peers) for each student is not the 
whole classroom but the friends that he/she has nominated. Contrary to the peer-
effect literature, we can then study the impact of the network structure, in particu-
lar the centrality of each student and the distance in the network §between stu-
dents, on the convergence of political beliefs. 
II.B. Empirical aspects of networks 
A growing empirical literature has documented the effects of social net-
works on behavior (see e.g. Jackson, 2008, 2011, 2014; Jackson et al., 2015; Jack-
son and Zenou, 2015; Blume et al., 2011; Ioannides, 2012; Advani and Malde, 
2014; Topa and Zenou, 2015 for overviews). Since social networks are so preva-
lent in economic settings, modeling these networks is essential in order to under-
stand how network structure affects behavior. However, it is very difficult to 
cleanly test theoretical predictions using data, since there are many confounding 
features in the environment. 
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    The estimation of network effects is indeed complicated by several is-
sues: reflection problem, common shocks and endogenous network formation. 
  It is well-known that when estimating peer effects using a linear-in-
means model (i.e. when regressing individual activity level on the average activity 
level in the neighborhood/among the peers), the endogenous and contextual ef-
fects cannot be separately identified due to the reflection problem, first formulated 
by Manski (1993). With explicit social network data, as we have here, this prob-
lem is eluded (see, e.g. Bramoullé et al., 2009; Lee and Liu, 2010; Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2009; Lin, 2010; Liu et al., 2014). Indeed, the reflection problem 
arises in linear-in-means models because individuals interact in groups - individu-
als are affected by all individuals belonging to their group and by nobody outside 
the group. In the case of social networks, instead, since the reference group is 
individual specific, this is not true because peer groups are overlapping. Formally, 
social effects are identified (i.e. no reflection problem) if at least two individuals 
in the same network have different links (Bramoullé et al., 2009) is generally sat-
isfied in any real-world network. 
    Another concern is the fact that students might be exposed to common 
shocks that drive the convergence of beliefs, irrespective of their social interac-
tion. One of the most plausible candidates is a teacher fixed effects. Students who 
have been randomly assigned to a group are also exposed to the same teachers. 
We run various placebo tests in this paper to rule out the direct impact of the 
group on beliefs formation. In particular, we show that the main driving force in 
the convergence process is the structure of the network within the group, and in 
particular direct paths between friends.  
The other (and often most) important issue is the potential endogeneity of 
the networks. Indeed, as stated above, people have proclivities to link to others 
similar to themselves (homophily), both on observed characteristics and unob-
served characteristics that could influence their behavior. By failing to account for 
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similarities in (unobserved) characteristics, similar behaviors might be mistakenly 
attributed to interactive effects when they are actually due to underlying charac-
teristics or exposure to common stimuli. As discussed by Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Imbens (2013), Graham (2015), Jackson et al. (2015), there is no simple solution 
to this problem. One can explicitly model the network formation process and 
structurally estimate it (see, e.g. Mele, 2013; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 
2013; Chandrasekhar and Jackson, 2014; Graham, 2014; Badev, 2014), or use 
instrumental variables (Bifulco et al., 2011; Bramoullé et al., 2009; Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2009; Patacchini and Zenou, 2014). 
Another way out is to use controlled experiments. In the field of networks, 
this has been implemented by either (i) fully controlling the network of relation-
ships in the laboratory (Choi et al., 2012; Kearns et al., 2009) or (ii) assigning 
subjects in the field positions in a network through which they must communicate 
(Centola, 2010, 2011; Goeree et al., 2010; Babcock and Hartman, 2010; Cai et al., 
2015). In the latter papers, the network is still endogenous and not randomized. 
What is randomized is the intervention. For example, in Babcock and Hartman 
(2010), the network is self-reported and thus not random, but subjects (students at 
UC Santa Barbara) have different fractions of their friends who are being random-
ly treated (free access to exercise at the university gym). 
In our paper, we use a natural experiment where agents are randomly allo-
cated to the network. We believe this is one of the first papers that uses such a 
strategy in the context of networks. It gives a “clean” identification strategy that 
allows testing the effect of network position on educational outcomes. 
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II.C. Social learning 
There is an interesting literature on learning in social settings.6  From a 
theoretical viewpoint, two basic approaches have been considered. One is a 
Bayesian approach, where agents update their beliefs based on either communica-
tion or observation of other agents’ actions over time. This approach provides a 
nice benchmark for what happens with full rationality (see e.g. Bala and Goyal, 
1998, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2011). Another approach is more mechanical, where 
agents repeatedly process the information from their neighbors according to fixed 
rules (see e.g. DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel, 2003; Golub, and 
Jackson, 2010, 2012).  
From an empirical viewpoint, the social learning literature has provided 
several major insights. First, careful observational studies, natural experiments, 
and field experiments have established the importance of social learning in many 
domains, such as in the introduction of new technologies and innovations (e.g. 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Henkel and Maurer, 
2010; Conley and Udry; 2010) and labor markets (Granovetter, 1974; Munshi, 
2003; Topa, 2001; Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008; Damm, 2009; Beaman, 2012). 
Second, some studies carefully measure social networks and estimate the relative 
effect of geographic neighbors, direct friends, and second-order friends. The evi-
dence on this question is mixed, with some papers finding an almost equal influ-
ence of second-order neighbors (Kremer and Miguel, 2007) and others finding no 
                                                 
6
 For overviews, see Goyal (2011) and Mobius and Rosenblat (2014). 
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effect (Rao, Mobius and Rosenblat, 2007)7 or significant decay (Patacchini and 
Zenou, 2012; Mobius, Szeidl and Phan, 2015).  
However, most of these studies focus on outcomes, with the adoption of 
new technologies or product, or employment outcomes. But they do not distin-
guish outcomes from beliefs, whether the process goes through the transmission 
of information or just imitation. This is what we do in our paper. 
III. BACKGROUND, DATA DESCRIPTION AND EXOGENOUS ALLOCATION 
This section provides a description of the context of the natural experi-
ment at Sciences Po. We first present the organization of the curriculum and the 
exogenous rules of allocation of first-year students across different classes. We 
then provide a description of our data and social links among Sciences Po stu-
dents. 
III.A. Sciences Po background and organization 
Since its foundation, Sciences Po has always been strongly involved in the 
training of politician and high level civil servants. The university (called “Ecole 
libre des Sciences Politiques” at that time) was founded in 1872, after the defeat 
of France against Prussia, and its explicit aim was to provide a modern training to 
the French elite, akin to the one received in Germany. Although being a fully pri-
vate institution until 1945, it soon gained a de facto monopoly for the preparation 
of examinations enabling to enter the highest level of the French administration. 
In particular, 80 to 90% of the students entering Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
                                                 
7 They find that there is important positive social learning from direct 
friends but not second-order friends about the benefits of flu vaccination in a 
study of undergraduate students at a private university. 
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(the most prestigious public exam) each year have been trained originally at Sci-
ences Po (Rouban, 2014a). The university has also strong links with French poli-
ticians. Between 12 to 15% of French MPs elected in the last decades graduated 
from Sciences Po (Rouban, 2011), as well as more than fifteen percent of the 
mayors of cities above 30,000 inhabitants (Rouban, 2014b). Sciences Po students 
are also extremely present in the executive branch, with many ministries coming 
from Sciences Po.  
While not all Sciences Po students want to become politician or civil serv-
ant, politics is much more important for them than for students from other univer-
sities or Grandes écoles. One tenth of the students are member of a political party, 
a very large proportion compared to their age group. About one quarter of the 
students choose a master in public affair, which is the traditional path of access to 
French administration. Therefore, Sciences Po plays the central role in the train-
ing of the French political and administrative elite. 
As most Grandes écoles students, Sciences Po students are very different 
from the students enrolled in public universities. They are academically stronger, 
and come from a much more wealthy background.  
To change its reputation of an elite school nurturing networking and ho-
mophily, Sciences Po has implemented various innovative pedagogical reforms in 
the recent years, such as quotas for students from poor suburbs and a widening of 
recruitment outside Paris from different French regions and abroad. One of the 
most important innovations implemented in 2007 by the former dean, Richard 
Descoings, was to force first-year students from different socio-economic back-
ground to mix with up each other. To achieve this goal, students are exogenously 
allocated to different classes at school entry.  
The first year of Sciences Po bachelor is made of a large curriculum core, 
with six introductory courses in microeconomics, macroeconomics, history, soci-
ology, political science, and constitutional law. Each of these courses consists in 
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one weekly lecture, and compulsory weekly tutorials. The tutorials last two hours, 
gather about twenty students each, and enable to review the materials seen in the 
lecture and to do exercises (such as oral presentation, for instance). It involves a 
lot of work in small groups in order to do collective assignments. Since the num-
ber of students enrolled in the lectures is large (about 800), the tutorials are where 
most social interactions across students take place.   
In order to foster interactions, the administration chose few years ago to 
link tutorials together into packs. Therefore, students are assigned the same 
classmates across all the subjects. This was implemented because the administra-
tion felt that many students were isolated because of the large size of the program. 
It further reinforced the role of tutorial as creating social links.  
Other sources of social interactions are associations (close to one hundred, 
including political parties and student unions), sports, and the monthly parties 
organized by the student office. However, the interactions in the tutorials are 
much stronger, with at least three meetings a week, and many opportunities of 
working together through group work. As we show in the next section, tutorials 
are responsible for the majority of friendship link formation.  
III.B. Data and Survey description  
Our analysis is based on first-year students who entered Sciences Po Paris 
the academic year 2013 (starting in September).  In March 2014, we performed a 
survey/game for all the first-year students (800 students), and ask incentive-
compatible questions to elicit social networks (as in Leider et al., 2009 and 2010). 
We surveyed their cultural values and political opinions, as well as their network 
of friends, through an Internet platform. To maximize the participation rate, which 
is critical in empirical studies on networks, since a large rate of non-response can 
create bias in the estimates (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2011), we incentivize the 
survey. We offered material incentives taking the form of a lottery for twenty-five 
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iPads, each iPad having a monetary value of approximately 300 Euros. Given the 
number of participants, each student had an average probability of about 6% to 
win. We choose to give them gifts in order to avoid crowding their intrinsic moti-
vations, and frame the participation to the survey as an altruistic act leading to a 
reciprocal reward, with a guarantee of full confidentiality. Eventually, 68.4% (547 
out of 800) of the students answered to at least some question in the survey, and 
65.6% (526 out of 800) completed the whole survey.   
Another critical aspect of such surveys is to get truthful answers, since 
some students could fill the survey at random in order to do it more quickly. We 
thus designed the survey as a coordination game. Not only we asked students who 
their friends were, but we also asked them how they met them, how much time 
they spent together, which activities they did together, and how strong was their 
relationships. We announced in the survey that their answers would be cross-
checked with those of the other students, and that if their answers matched those 
of their friends, they would gain points, later converted into an additional proba-
bility of winning the gift. We did not disclose the exact mechanism, in order to 
avoid that some students engaged into strategic behavior and try to actively coor-
dinate with other people. The survey was done during a vacation week, which 
limited the possibility for the students to interact with each other and to fulfill the 
survey together. We also required that they complete the whole questionnaire in 
order to be included in the lottery. We present in Appendix the details of the ques-
tions and procedures, as well as the algorithm to allocate the prizes. We also re-
port robustness tests showing that students indeed answered honestly to the sur-
vey.  
Table 1 – Panel A reports the main statistics on the number of friends and 
the social network structure among the first-year students. The average and max-
imum number of nominations per student is 8.8 and 21, respectively, with a very 
high variance. Moreover, there seems to be some small world properties with a 
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very small average path length (3.7) and a relatively small diameter (9). The clus-
tering is also relatively high, which means that roughly 25 percent of students 
have friends of friends who are friends. Even though it is not reported in the table, 
there are around 50 percent as many reciprocal friends as reported friend. We 
also look at the percentage of answers that are correct for each of the four sur-
veyed characteristics of friendships among the reciprocal links. The rate of 
agreement is quite high, particularly for the way of meeting, which is less arbi-
trary and subject to disagreement. Note that a disagreement does not imply a lie 
and can be an honest mistake. This confirms that students mostly answered truth-
fully to the survey. Another important result of the survey is the fact that 44% of 
the friendship links were formed thanks to the tutorials, so belonging to a same 
group is likely to be a powerful instrument for friendship formation.  
The second part of the survey was devoted to questions about political 
opinion and values. We asked them their political opinion today, and the summer 
before admission, by using a Likert scale from 1 to 10, and if they were a member 
of political party (today, or in the past). We also asked questions on related politi-
cal opinions such as attitudes toward immigrants, by using question taken from 
the world value survey.  
Table 1 – Panel B shows the descriptive statistics about the political opin-
ion and values of Sciences Po students. The political opinion of Sciences Po stu-
dents are close to the center. Even though the mean of the political opinion hardly 
changes before and after the entry in Sciences Po, there is a reduction of the vari-
ance of about 15 percent. And the entrance in Sciences Po is associated with a 
large increase in the enrolment in a political party.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of political opinion. We can see at a first 
glance that there is some change in the distribution of belief after few months of 
studying with new classmates. If the average does not change very much, the 
shape of the distribution changes, with a reduction in its dispersion.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 Table A2 in the Appendix reports the main descriptive statistics of our 
sample. Sciences Po students come massively from a privileged background, 
more than two third of them coming from a family with a very high social status. 
The median total gross income of the students who reported it is very high, above 
80,000 Euros. There is a large majority of women, which is not surprising since it 
is a university specialized in social science. While foreigners are not very numer-
ous (only seven percent of the sample), students having a dual nationality repre-
sent a sizable part of the sample (13.3 percent). This is due in part to the fact that 
a non-trivial share of the students has an immigrant background following the 
implementation of an Affirmative Action program targeting students coming from 
deprived high schools. While this program is not based on ethnicity, it stills con-
cerns many students belonging to ethnic minorities, since these students are over-
represented in under-performing high schools. Almost 20 percent of the sample is 
coming from this Affirmative Action program. Finally, one quarter of the students 
are enrolled into several subprograms, corresponding to dual majors. 
III.C. Exogenous allocation of students across groups 
This section documents the exogenous allocation of students across the 
different groups of tutorials at school entry. We first describe the allocation pro-
cess and then provide formal statistical tests on exogeneity. 
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As discussed above, a crucial part of the curriculum is the enrolment in tu-
torials, which are grouped in pack. Since we will use them later on as an instru-
ment for friendship link formation, it is crucial that allocation to tutorial is ran-
dom. Several features of the enrolment process make extremely unlikely that stu-
dents choose tutorial in purpose, for instance for schedule reason, for being as-
signed a given instructor, or to be with their friends.  
First of all, it is impossible to have simultaneously access to the schedules 
of all tutorials in a same pack during the enrolment procedure, which is done 
online. Students can only choose a given tutorial in a given subject (and have ac-
cess to the schedule and the professor’s name in this subject only), and then are 
automatically enrolled in the corresponding tutorials in the other subjects. Recon-
structing the schedules in all subjects for each pack means to spend a lot of time 
across different screens, while at the same time the enrolment procedure is ongo-
ing, and lasts about half an hour. As a result, comparing the value of each pack in 
term of schedule is very difficult.  
Moreover, students do not have information about teachers’ quality and 
grading policy. Indeed, there is a large turnover of instructors, and the enrolment 
is done before the beginning of the academic year, as in Hoffmann and Oreopou-
los (2009). Therefore, students have little possibility to acquire information about 
teachers by interacting with past first year students, and they cannot select into 
tutorials based on their expected difficulties.  
Not only the registration is completed in a short time, but it is also done in 
a gradual way. Every five or six minutes, the administration opens new slots in 
each pack, in order to avoid over-burdening the system. Since all the students are 
connected at that time, and try to enroll into tutorials, it means that each slot if 
fulfilled very quickly, sometimes in few seconds. As a result, coordinating in or-
der to register into the same tutorial is difficult, and success is quite unlikely.  
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The registration is anyway organized before the beginning of the academic 
year, and for the two semesters, which means that students have little opportunity 
to know each other before the enrolment process. They only meet for a three day 
orientation week few days before the registration procedure, which is unlikely to 
create links strong enough to induce students to try to coordinate each other.  
In order to test that students are indeed randomly allocated to group, we 
estimate a dyadic model of group formation. We regress a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the two members of a dyad are enrolled in the same group on a 
set of dyadic controls, which capture the distance between the characteristics of 
the two members of the dyad. We use variables determined before the beginning 
of the year, and run the test only on the students who answered to the survey, 
since we want to test if pre-entrance political opinions have an impact on group 
formation. 
Table 2 reports the results of this test. The explanatory power of the model 
is very low, with an adjusted R-square equal to zero. Most coefficients are insig-
nificant (while the sample is very large, since we are using dyadic variables). The 
coefficient of the admission procedure (i.e. the way students entered into Sciences 
Po) is only marginally significant, and its magnitude is very low. Only the coeffi-
cient on program is significant, which is to be expected since students from dif-
ferent programs do not mix across tutorials. This confirms that allocation to group 
is random. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our empirical design focuses on the following dyadic specification: 
 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖. (1) 
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The unit of observation is a pair of students i and j. DYij, the differences in 
an outcome variable Y between i and j, is related to the binary variable Lij of undi-
rected friendship between the two (Lij = 1 iff at least one of the two names the 
other as friend). The coefficient of interest β addresses how much the difference 
in outcome Y between two individuals is affected by their friendship link. A nega-
tive β corresponds to a convergence effect, and a positive β a divergence effect. 
Convergence (or divergence) is about the difference between what would happen 
with and without a friendship link, over the period of 6 months between the en-
trance to Sciences Po and the survey. If friendship Lij is assigned randomly to 
different pairs of students, a simple OLS would identify the convergence effect β. 
We further control for other pairwise variables: the pre-Sciences Po differ-
ence in political opinions DYij0 (based on a retrospective question), and a vector of 
the pairwise commonness and differences in other predetermined variables Xij. 
They include dummies for common Gender, common Nationality, common Ad-
mission type (essentially regular admission or affirmative action admission), 
common Honour Graduation from high school, common District of high school, 
common parental professions, common current residence’s ZIP code, and the dif-
ference in in Tuition fees that proxies for the difference in parents’ income. Their 
omission would likely produce a homophily bias, because they are likely correlat-
ed with both the friendship link Lij and the outcome differences DYij. Indeed, if a 
control variable Xijom is omitted, the potential bias is γomCorr(Lij, Xijom), which 
pushes the OLS estimate away from zero (making the estimated coefficient 
stronger than it really is.) The difference between OLS estimates with and without 
control variables tells us the magnitude of the homophily bias due to observables. 
In reference to Altonji, Elder and Taber’s (2005) argument that selection based on 
observables is usually stronger than selection based on unobservables, we may 
gauge the order of magnitude of the homophily bias due to unobservables. 
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To address the homophily bias caused by unobserved dyadic characteris-
tics that correlate with both friendship and outcome, we instrument Lij by the in-
dicator CGij  whether i and j are in the same group. As discussed earlier, CGij  is 
arguably exogeneous and uncorrelated with any observable and unobservable 
pairwise variables regarding i and j, while it is also a strong predictor of Lij. Given 
the exogeneity of CGij, the inclusion of control variables only helps improve esti-
mation efficiency, and is no longer needed to treat potential homophily bias. In 
particular, there should not be a homophily bias due to observables, so the IV re-
sults with and without control variables are expected to be similar. 
The difference between IV and OLS estimates is not only due to homophi-
ly bias, but also the heterogeneity of the convergence effect. The IV strategy 
would identify the Local Average Treatment Effect (Angrist and Imbens 1994) of 
a friendship link on outcome differences,8 averaged among the compliers, i.e. the 
pairs who have become friends if and only if they are put together in a group. In 
this case, the compliers are the group affected by the policy, arguably the most 
important group. 
Some concerns of the overall empirical design may arise. First, we consid-
er convergence on the differences in contemporaneous opinions and attitudes DYij. One may opt to use the differences in the change of opinions DYij − DYij0 as 
an outcome variable in our framework, but in presence of the control variable DYij0, it does not matter to β whether the outcome variable is DYij or DYij − DYij0. 
Even when the variable DYij0 comes from retrospective questions and is potentially 
biased towards contemporaneous opinions, such that DYij0 = ρDYij + (1−
                                                 
8
 The last condition for the LATE interpretation is monotonicity: there are no defiers, i.e. pairs who would not become 
friends if and only if they are not in the same group. In our context, monotonicity is likely satisfied. 
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ρ)DYij0∗, where the true pre-Sciences Po variable is DYij0∗, it would at best bias the 
convergence coefficient towards zero, i.e. against our finding significant conver-
gence effects. 
Second, the dyadic specification repeats each student in her relationship 
with all others. We account for this feature in the statistical inference by using 
common group double clustering: the error terms from any two observations are 
allowed to correlate, if they share a common group. 
Third, the instrumental variable needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction 
that common-group membership does not affect differences in opinions via chan-
nels other than the friendship links. We will later relax this assumption to explore 
how indirect links affect convergence in different outcomes. 
Fourth, the dyadic specification separates each pair of students from their 
relationships to other individuals. For instance, there is no constraint on the total 
number of friendship links for each individual. This is a cost to our “reduced 
form” dyadic approach. While we gain in clarifying the role of the IV in our set-
ting, we may not stay close to a specific theoretical model that could produce pre-
dictions in the form of structural models. 
V. BASELINE RESULTS 
We first establish the causal effect of friendship on convergence of politi-
cal opinions, using the empirical strategy described in section IV.  
Table 3 shows the first stage relationships between common group mem-
bership and undirected friendship links in the sample of dyads for which control 
variables are available. The relationship between common group membership and 
friendship is particularly strong, as being in the same group increases the chance 
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of a pair of students to become friends by 35 percentage points.9 This is several 
orders of magnitude above the coefficients of any other common characteristics, 
including those that have a statistically significant effect on friendship such as 
common gender, common admission type, common department of high school, 
common high school graduation honors, common residence zip code, and the dif-
ferences in political opinion before entrance to Sciences Po (the maximum is 10), 
and the differences in tuition fees (the maximum is 10,000). Common group 
membership alone explains for about 15% of the variation in pairwise undirected 
friendships across dyads, whereas the other control variables could explain only 
1.6% more. Compared to any other observables, it is by far the best predictor of 
friendships. Thus, common exposure to first-year group studies has significantly 
caused friendships among Sciences Po’s students. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 shows second stage results for differences in answers on political 
opinions in March 2014, and compares them to OLS results without IVs. Column 
(1) shows the results OLS without control variables, and columns (2) and (3) ex-
hibit OLS results with and without the benchmark set of control variables while 
controlling for the differences in political opinion before entering Sciences Po. In 
columns (2) and (3), the coefficient of undirected friendship is around 0.13, pre-
dicting a gap of 0.13 points on a scale of 1 to 10 for friends versus non-friends. 
This gap is highly persistent over time, as 53% of its variation could be explained 
by the pre-Sciences Po difference in political opinion. When we do not control for 
                                                 
9
 We use a linear probability model in the first stage for clarity of interpretation, following Angrist and Pischke’s 2009 
suggestion. Results are very similar, and available upon request, when we first run a logit model of friendship over com-
mon group and other characteristics, and then use the predicted probability as IV for actual friendship in the second stage 
(as described in Angrist and Pischke 2009, Section 4.6). 
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the pre-Sciences Po difference, the coefficient of friendship jumps to 0.22 (col-
umn (1)), consistent with the observation that the pre-Sciences Po difference is a 
significant predictor of both friendships and the gap in outcome, thus its inclusion 
as a control could address an important homophily bias. On the other hand, the 
other control variables do not seem to induce a strong homophily bias, likely be-
cause they are much less correlated with the gap in outcome. 
Columns (5) and (6) show the IV results of around 0.16, respectively 
without and with control variables, but controlling for the pre-Sciences Po differ-
ence in political opinions. The coefficient’s magnitude implies a convergence 
among first-year friends of 0.16 points over a scale from 1 to 10 in political opin-
ions, over a period of 6 months. The effect accounts to 8% of the mean (1.92) and 
11% of the standard deviation (1.47). By extrapolation, it is equivalent to a “half-
life” of the average differences in political opinion of 6 months / log0.50.92 = 50 
months, or roughly 4 years. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Even when we exclude the control of pre-Sciences Po difference in politi-
cal opinion, as shown in column (4), the IV estimate increases slightly to 0.19, 
suggesting that the previous issue of homophily bias due to pre-Sciences Po dif-
ferences has been properly addressed by the IV strategy. The stability of the IV 
estimates with respect to the inclusion of observables strengthens our claim that it 
appropriately deals with homophily biases induced by observables and also unob-
servables, as discussed in section IV. 
The differences between the IV and OLS estimates can be explained by 
two reasons. First, the IV strategy corrects for homophily bias. Homophily, if un-
accounted for, would likely induce a bias towards more convergence, hence a 
larger OLS coefficient in absolute value, compared with the IV coefficient. It is 
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consistent with an OLS estimate of 0.22 and an IV estimate of only 0.19 (columns 
(1) versus (4)), when we do not control for pre-Sciences Po difference in political 
opinion.10 However, the existence of a homophily bias does not explain why IV 
estimates could be larger in absolute value than OLS estimates (columns (2) and 
(3) versus columns (5) and (6)). The other reason for this discrepancy is that the 
IV strategy estimates a local average treatment effect (LATE) among compliers to 
the group mixing policy. The higher value of IV indicates stronger convergence 
effects among pairs of students that become friends precisely because they end up 
in the same group. We will detail the heterogeneity of convergence effects in the 
next subsection. 
The IV estimates can be compared with the reduced form estimate of 0.05 
in column (7), obtained from OLS regressions of the outcome gap in political 
opinion on common group membership. Let us consider four different types of 
pairs of students, based on two characteristics: friendship and common group. The 
reduced form coefficient correctly identifies same group convergence as the aver-
age effect on the outcome gap of same group versus different group pairs, where 
the average is taken among pairs of friends and non-friends within the group (ver-
sus different-group pairs). The contribution of the effects of pairs of friends can 
be approximated by the IV estimate of 0.16 times the average share of pairs of 
“compliers” among same-group pairs, indicated by the effect of same group 
membership on friendship link of 0.35 from Table 3. By multiplying 0.16 by 0.35, 
we obtain very close results to the reduced form coefficient of 0.05. It means that 
pairs of non-friends contribute practically nothing to the reduced form effect. 
Same-group convergence in political opinion thus happens only among direct 
friends. 
                                                 
10




Next, Table 5 – Panel A shows some results of convergence in participa-
tion in political and associative activities, consistent with the expressed opinions. 
Columns (1) and (2) show that pairs of friends significantly converge in their as-
sociative lives. They tend to follow their friends in joining some associations, and 
also tend to join the same associations more often. While column (3) shows that 
the convergence is not significant for active participation in political parties, 
which remains rare among first-year students, column (4) indicates that, among 
those who do enroll in a party, a pair of friends becomes more likely to enroll in 
the same party. Thus, students’ political actions follow their words. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 –Panel B then shows some convergence in students’ views on the 
importance of different factors in their future: friends become more similar in 
their assessments of the role of family networks. However, we fail to detect con-
vergence in their views of the social networks built via Sciences Po, or in their 
views about the importance of individual efforts, individual networks, or their 
degree. 
In sum, we find consistent evidence of convergence of political opinions 
and beliefs on politics, and of participation in political parties and associations. 
The evidence is consistent in different ways with the claim that our IV strategy 
has appropriately addressed a potential homophily bias. The result also hints that 
the homophily bias on convergence, induced by either observable or unobservable 
characteristics, tends to be relatively small, which could be seen as good news for 
other studies in similar contexts that do not properly control for it. 
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VI. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS AND MECHANISMS 
VI.A. Convergence among dissimilar pairs 
The theoretical and empirical literatures on learning in networks typically 
assume homogenous effects of direct links on a node’s beliefs. Examples include 
theories using average-based belief updating processes (the term coined by Golub 
and Jackson, 2012, for a generalized definition of the DeGroot’s belief updating), 
or empirical estimations of peer effect in networks (such as Calvó-Armengol 
Patacchini, and Zenou, 2009, or Bramoullé, Djebari and Fortin, 2009). These the-
oretical and empirical models assume that each individual is influenced in the 
same way among her friends. Our framework allows a natural exploration how 
pairwise convergence varies based on the pairwise individual and network charac-
teristics, with a focus on political opinion. 
Under simple average-based belief updating processes, homophily has 
been shown to slow down information transmission in networks (Golub and Jack-
son 2012). We now want to understand whether the variation of the convergence 
effect across different pairs reinforces or dampens this phenomenon. If conver-
gence is stronger among pairs of similar students (that are more likely to be 
friends), Golub and Jackson’s effect should be mitigated. In contrast, if conver-
gence is emphasized among pairs of dissimilar students (that are less likely to be 
friends), in this heterogeneous effect framework Golub and Jackson’s effect 
would be strengthened. 
Table 6 shows that the convergence coefficient varies substantially de-
pending on predetermined differences. Each column includes an interaction term 
between undirected friendship and one of the three variables, which are: differ-
ences in pre-Sciences Po political opinion, common gender, and common admis-
sion type. The corresponding instruments include common group membership and 
its interactions with those three variables. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
28 
in column (1) indicate that convergence in political opinion is significantly higher 
among pairs with more different opinions before entering Sciences Po. There is 
some hint that among students with identical initial opinions, friendship may have 
brought divergence, not convergence, although the positive coefficient of 0.05 is 
not statistically significant. We will return to the possibility of divergence in the 
next section. Similarly, we find that convergence is stronger for pairs of different 
genders and different admission types (the type being overwhelmingly either gen-
eral admission process or admission by “prioritized education convention”, a form 
of Affirmative Action towards students in disadvantaged areas). While only the 
interaction of friendship and common gender is statistically significant at 5%, the 
coefficients of those interactions are very large compared to the baseline coeffi-
cient of undirected friendship. They suggest that convergence comes mostly from 
pairs of very different compliers.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
By homophily, those pairs of very different students are less likely to be-
come friends. We now explore the variation of the convergence coefficient by the 
propensity to become friends between pairs, excluding the effect of same group 
membership. We run probit regressions of undirected friendship on predetermined 
variables previously used as controls, and then predict the propensity to become 
friends between any pairs of students. The probit regression includes the same 
group dummy variable as a regressor, but the propensity score prediction excludes 
that variable.  
Column (4) in Table 6 shows how the convergence coefficient varies with 
prior propensity to become friends. We interact friendship with the propensity to 
become friends, and instrument them with same group membership and its inter-
action with the same propensity. The coefficient of the interaction between friend-
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ship and propensity to become friends is positive, and statistically significant and 
sizeable.  
We visualize the heterogeneity of the convergence coefficient  by the 
pairwise propensity to become friends  by a semi-parametric estimation of . For 
each grid point  that separates the 10 deciles of  (), we weight the observations by 
a Gaussian kernel (with bandwidth equal to 20% of the range of ) around , so that 
pairs with  farther away from  receive less weights, and then run the benchmark 
IV regression with those weights to obtain . The resulting estimates are then plot-
ted in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
We observe that the IV-estimated convergence coefficient is decreasing in 
the propensity to become friends between each pair, in contrast to the relative 
stability of the OLS estimate. It means that among compliers, those who are least 
likely to comply will experience the greatest convergence due to friendship. We 
also note that the OLS estimate is indeed larger than the IV estimate in absolute 
value for pairs with a very high propensity score, which suggests the presence of 
homophily bias among pairs that are most likely to be friends, i.e. pairs that are 
most likely subject to the homophily bias. 
Overall, convergence takes place a lot more among pairs of students who 
are the least likely to become friends. It is consistent, for example, with a simple 
model of belief updating that puts more weight on less correlated signals. The 
heterogeneous effect that we find thus strengthens the Golub and Jackson’s effect. 
We also find that while, on average, there is little worry about homophily bias in 
contexts similar to ours, it would raise more concerns among pairs that are more 
likely to become friends. 
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VI.B. Convergence among extremists 
We further explore the heterogeneity of the convergence coefficient by 
plotting it against the pair’s political opinions. We undertake a similar estimation 
of that coefficient as a function of the pair’s political opinions as follows. For 
each grid point  that corresponds to the two students’ political opinions (), we 
weight the observations by a Gaussian kernel (with bandwidth equal to 2) around 
the point , so that pairs farther away from  receive less weights, and then run the 
benchmark IV regression with those weights to obtain . The estimates are then 
plotted on the tri-dimensional Figure 3. For the purpose of exposition, we do not 
show tri-dimensional confidence bands. Because of the symmetric nature of our 
regression equation, the graph is symmetric with respect to the main diagonal of 
all points of political opinion. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
From Figure 3, three stark observations emerge. First, friendship conver-
gence is strongest among the most dissimilar pairs, namely pairs of students with 
opposite extreme political views before entering Sciences Po. Echoing the previ-
ous section, this finding suggests that extremism may be mitigated by exposure 
and friendship. Second, the coefficient remains negative even among pairs of stu-
dents with the same moderate pre-Sciences Po views. That is, among similar 
moderate students, those who do not become friends naturally diverge, but those 
who end up as friends diverge less, and hold on to each other’s opinions more. 
Third, and perhaps most striking, pairs of similar extreme leftists diverge 
in their opinions. The effect is particularly strong and consistent among extreme 
leftists. Extreme leftists are defined as students with a political opinion from 1 to 
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3.11 It means that pairs that become friends tend to separate from each other, 
probably with one moving closer to the center, more than those who do not. 
The divergence effect among extreme leftists can be further tested with 
different outcome variables, as shown in Table 7. It is strongly significant for po-
litical opinion and attitude towards immigration, with very large magnitude (for 
political opinion, it is 3 times as large in absolute value as the convergence effect 
of the other pairs). We do not find the similar effect among other types of pairs, as 
already illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The divergence effect among extreme leftists is not consistent with stand-
ard models of beliefs updating. Instead, a possible explanation is that those stu-
dents have high needs for self-distinction. It follows that they have become ex-
treme prior to Sciences Po, and when they meet similarly extreme students at Sci-
ences Po, they prefer to differentiate themselves from their friends by adjusting 
their actions and views away from their friends. 
VII. THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURE 
We further study how convergence varies by individuals’ positions in the 
social network, notably by the network centrality of each individual. We use two 
measures: eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality, as they represent 
quite different concepts (their correlation in our sample is about 30%).12 We run 
                                                 
11
 Results remain similar with different threshold of extreme left. There are a lot less extreme rightists, so statistical in-
ference is difficult. 
12
 Betweenness centrality of a given agent is equal to the number of shortest paths between all pairs of agents that pass 
through the given agent. In other words, an agent is central if s/he lies on several shortest paths among other pairs of 
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statistical tests with pairs of stars and non-stars, by categorizing “star” and “non-
star” individuals as those whose centrality are respectively above or below the 
90th percentile. The results are reported in Table 8. 
The effect is not statistically significant for convergence of political opin-
ion, although we do see that the coefficient of convergence is strongest for the 
asymmetric pairs of a star and a non-star when using the betweenness centrality 
(column (6)). In other words, people’s beliefs converge towards the beliefs of 
stars, which are the students who have the highest betweenness centrality. Taken 
together, there seems to be evidence that stars strongly attract non-stars when they 
become friends. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We have so far considered only the effects of direct links, under the as-
sumption that indirect links do not contribute to the convergence within each 
group. We now relax this assumption to check if there is evidence of convergence 
among individuals without immediate links. We address this question by using 
each pair’s same group membership as instrumental variable for their social dis-
tance (length of the shortest path between them on the network.) Results are re-
ported in Table 9.  
To facilitate the comparison, benchmark IV results from Table 4 are 
shown again in column (1). In column (2), we use same group membership as IV 
for social distance in the full sample. The estimate is interpretable as the average 
                                                                                                                                     
agents. Betweenness centrality thus captures the importance as an intermediary. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the 
influence of an agent in a network. It takes all possible paths in a network (not only the shortest ones) and assigns relative 
scores to all agents in the network based on the concept that connections to high-scoring agents contribute more to the 
score of the agent in question than equal connections to low-scoring agents. It thus captures indirect reach so that being 
well-connected to well-connected others makes you more central. For example, Google's PageRank is a variant of the 
eigenvector centrality measure. See Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Jackson (2008) for precise definitions of all network 
centrality measures. 
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causal response, averaged over all pairs that are induced by the IV to move closer 
in social distance. The magnitude of the effects are a lot smaller than the corre-
sponding benchmark coefficients, suggesting that the effect is not always strong 
for all values of social distance (convergence is now manifested with a positive 
coefficient.) We further cut the sample into subsamples to compare uniquely be-
tween pairs of consecutive social distances: distance 1 versus 2 in column (3), 
distance 2 versus 3 in column (4), and distance 3 versus farther distances in col-
umn (5). We find a strong concentration of convergence effect when social dis-
tance shrinks from 2 to 1 (the pair become direct friends). The magnitude of the 
convergence effect of this switch is relatively close to the benchmark results: 13% 
versus 16% for political opinion. Beyond direct friends, there is no significant 
evidence of convergence of political opinion. Network structure thus does not 
matter to political opinions convergence beyond direct links.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have studied how a public policy (random allocation of 
students to tutorials) shapes convergence of political beliefs through newly-
formed social networks. We find that students’ political opinions converge partic-
ularly strongly between friends and the magnitude of the convergence is quite 
substantial: around 0.16 points over a scale from 1 to 10 in political opinions, 
which accounts for 11% of the standard deviation. We also show that conver-
gence in political opinion happens only among friends, while the effect would be 
insignificant if we were focusing on pairs of non-friends belonging to the same 
group. Moreover, friends not only converge in political beliefs, but also in behav-
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iors: pairs of friends significantly converge in their associative lives and among 
those who do enroll in a political party; a pair of friends becomes more likely to 
enroll in the same political party.  
We next analyze potential heterogeneous effects to analyze the mecha-
nisms and channels behind this convergence process. A first important finding is 
that convergence is higher among students with more initial differences in politi-
cal attitudes. We also find that convergence works partly thanks to common 
friends: convergence is higher when more common friends hold opinion in be-
tween. Strikingly, people’s beliefs converge towards the beliefs of stars, which 
are the students who have the highest network centrality (especially in terms of 
betweenness centrality). The last main heterogeneous effect is related to extrem-
ists: while there is a stronger convergence in beliefs among friends with opposite 
political priors, in contrast there is a divergence among friends who initially share 
extreme left priors. 
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 - Panel A: ”OR” Network statistics
Mean of degree per individual 8.8625
Variance of degree per individual 18.4842
Median of degree per individual 10
Maximum of degree per individual 21
Minimum of degree per individual 0
Diameter of the network 9
Average path length 3.7008
Overall clustering coefficient 0.241
Average clustering coefficient 0.271
Notes: Summary statistics are computed on the full
sample.
Table 1 - Panel B: Centrality Measures




Notes: Summary statistics are computed on the
reduced sample used for estimation.
Table 1 - Panel C: Political opinions (individual variables)
(1) (2)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Political opinion (March 2014) (1-10) 5.044 (1.755) 5.060 (1.709)
Pre-Sciences Po political opinion (August 2013) (1-10) 5.108 (1.957) 5.116 (1.936)
Enrolled in a political party (March 2014) (yes / no) 0.103 (0.251) 0.118 (0.322)
Enrolled in a political party (August 2013) (yes / no) 0.067 (0.305) 0.0775 (0.267)
Should firms hire national first? (1-10) 3.835 (2.615) 3.784 (2.596)
Notes: Summary statistics (1) refer to the full sample. Summary statistics (2) refer to the reduced sample used in estimation.
Table 1 - Panel D: Political opinions (dyadic variables)
(1) (2)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Difference in political opinion (March 2014) 1.931 (1.467) 1.924 (1.467)
Initial difference in political opinion (August 2013) 2.211 (1.631) 2.205 (1.629)
c.Enrolled in a political party (March 2014) (0.815) (0.388) (0.790) (0.407)
c.Enrolled in a political party (August 2013) 0.874 (0.332) 0.855 (0.352)
c.Enrolled in the same political party (March 2014) 0.868 (0.339) 0.862 (0.345)
Notes: Summary statistics (1) refer to the full sample. Summary statistics (2) refer to the reduced sample used in estimation.
The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the
same for both students in the pair.
Table 2: Balance Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Common Group
c. Gender 0.000595 0.000597 0.000589 0.000591
(0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00120)
c. Nationality 0.00222 0.00224 0.00199 0.00201
(0.00338) (0.00341) (0.00334) (0.00337)
c. Admission 0.00311** 0.00311** 0.00280* 0.00280*
(0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00148) (0.00148)
c. Program 0.0210*** - 0.0213*** -
(0.00109) (0.00125)
c. Honors Graduation (High School) 0.00108 0.00108 0.00113 0.00113
(0.00148) (0.00149) (0.00147) (0.00148)
c. Dpartment of High School 0.000328 0.000329 8.12e-05 7.99e-05
(0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00288) (0.00288)
Diff. in Tuition Fees -1.16e-07 -1.17e-07 -1.34e-07 -1.35e-07
(2.28e-07) (2.28e-07) (2.33e-07) (2.34e-07)
c. Parents Profession 0.00128 0.00128 0.00130 0.00130
(0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115)
Initial Diff. in Political Opinion (August 2013) -0.000148 -0.000148 -0.000571 -0.000572
(0.000349) (0.000350) (0.000472) (0.000473)
c. ZIP code 0.00287 0.00288 0.00226 0.00227
(0.00422) (0.00423) (0.00412) (0.00414)
c. Priority Admission - - 0.00233 0.00233
(0.00484) (0.00484)
c. Left -Left - - -0.00152 -0.00152
(0.00157) (0.00157)
c. Left - Right - - 0.00113 0.00114
(0.00189) (0.00190)
c. Living in Paris - - 0.00119 0.00119
(0.00156) (0.00157)
Observations 60,726 60,516 60,726 60,516
Sample: Benchmark Plus Benchmark Benchmark Plus Benchmark
Different Programs Different Programs
Individual Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 245.4 1.106 118.8 1.018
Notes: The benchmark sample includes those couple that are in the upper triangular part of the adjacency matrix, whose individuals
both answered to the question on their friendship network and for which we have values for the controls and for the variable ”Difference
in Political Opinion (March 2014). The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the
corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. F-stats are for the joint significance of the variables included in
the model. Standard errors are clustered at the individual 1 and individual 2 level.
Table 3: First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Undirected Friendship
c. Group 0.352*** 0.351*** 0.351***
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Initial Diff. in Political Opinion (August 2013) - -0.000962*** -0.000679
(0.000351) (0.000498)
c. Gender - 0.00583*** 0.00583***
(0.000923) (0.000920)
c. Nationality - 0.000725 -0.000277
(0.00425) (0.00413)
c. Admission - 0.00495*** 0.00415***
(0.00124) (0.00129)
c. Honours Graduation (High School) - 0.00278* 0.00290*
(0.00152) (0.00152)
c. District of High School - 0.0159*** 0.0158***
(0.00354) (0.00349)
Diff. in Tuition Fees - -5.94e-07*** -6.36e-07***
(2.01e-07) (2.10e-07)
c. Parents Profession - 0.00130 0.00125
(0.00100) (0.00104)
c. ZIP code - 0.00987** 0.0100**
(0.00451) (0.00455)
c. Priority Admission - - 0.00715
(0.00555)
c. Left - Left - - -0.00621***
(0.00218)
c. Left - Right - - -0.00494***
(0.00162)
c. Living in Paris - - -0.000539
(0.00104)
Observations 60,516 60,516 60,516
R-squared 0.167 0.170 0.170
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 298.9 68.75 39.81
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2
level. The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the
corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. F-stats are for the joint significance
of the variables included in the model. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the
footnote to the Table 1. Left is defined as having an initial political position of 5 or less (possible
answers goes from 1 to 10). Right is defined as having an initial political position of 6 or more.
Table 4: Friendship Convergence of Political Opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Difference in Political Opinion
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV Reduced Form
Undirected Friendship -0.223*** -0.133*** -0.129*** -0.188* -0.160*** -0.155*** -
(0.0579) (0.0398) (0.0409) (0.108) (0.0419) (0.0431)
Initial Diff. in Political Opinion (August 2013) - 0.527*** 0.528*** - 0.527*** 0.528*** 0.528
(0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0243)
c. Group - - - - - - -0.0546***
(0.0145)
Controls - - Yes - - Yes Yes
Observations 60,516 60,516 60,516 60,516 60,516 60,516 60,516
IV No No No Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Weak IV test stat. - - - 749.4 298.8 299.2 -
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2 level. When the number of cluster is to small to compute
clustered standard errors we report robust standard errors. The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the
corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to the Table 1. Controls
included the following variables: c. Gender, c. Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in Tuition Fees,
c. Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of
weak identification.
Table 5 - Panel A: Convergence of Political and Associative Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: c. Enrolment in c. Enrolment in c. Enrolment in c. Enrolment in the
Student Associations Same Association a Political Party Same Political Party
Undirected Friendship -0.108** -0.0565*** -0.0187 -0.1403
(0.0481) (0.0216) (0.0314) (0.1065)
Observations 55,409 27,145 61,564 820
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes No No Yes
Weak IV test stat. 254.4 344.5 753.1 8.529
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2 level. When the
number of cluster is to small to compute clustered standard errors we report robust standard errors. The prefix ”c.”
in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the same for
both students in the pair. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to the Table 1. Controls
included the following variables: c. Gender, c. Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District
of High School, Diff. in Tuition Fees, c. Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap
cluster-robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of weak identification.
Table 5 - Panel B: Convergence of Opinions on Determinants of Success
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variables: c. Importance of
Sc Po Degree Individual Network Individual Effort Sc Po Network Family Network
Undirected Friendship -0.0619 -0.0161 0.0285 0.00957 -0.0892***
(0.0526) (0.0342) (0.0201) (0.0176) (0.0328)
Observations 62,267 62,267 62,267 62,267 62,267
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak IV test stat. 297 297 297 297 297
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2 level. The prefix ”c.” in front
of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the same for both students in the
pair. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to the Table 1, removing those observation where the
”Difference in Trust” is missing. Controls included the following variables: c. Gender, c. Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour
Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in Tuition Fees, c. Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat
reports the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of weak identification.
Table 6: Heterogeneity of Convergence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Difference in Political Opinion
Undirected Friendship 0.0549 -0.318*** -0.348 -0.380***
(0.112) (0.114) (0.226) (0.119)
Friendship*Initial Pol. Opinion -0.101** - - -
(0.0417)
Initial Diff. in Political Opinion (August 2013) 0.530*** - -
(0.0240)
Friendship*Gender - 0.273 -
(0.178)
c. Gender - -0.0268 -
(0.0194)
Friendship*Admission - - 0.247
(0.222)
c. Admission - - -0.0112
(0.0423)
Friendship*Propensity Score - - - 21.85*
(11.30)
Observations 60,516 60,516 60,516 60,516
IV Same Group and Interactions
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes
WeakIV test stat. 55.48 99.33 24.04 89.78
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2
level. The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the
corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. The sample used is the benchmark
sample described in the footnote to the Table 1. Controls included the following variables: c. Gender,
c. Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in
Tuition Fees, c. Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-
robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of weak identification.
Table 7: Political Extremism and Divergence in Opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Difference in Political Opinion Attitude Towards Immigrants
Sub-samples: Two Extreme No Leftists Two Extreme Two Rightists Two Extreme No Leftists Two Extreme Two Rightists
Leftists Rightists Leftists Rightists
Undirected Friendship 0.477* -0.154** 0.0185 0.0339 0.344*** 0.109 -1.475 -0.0875
(0.285) (0.0705) (0.244) (0.142) (0.0736) (0.129) (0.897) (0.236)
Initial Diff. in Political Opinion 0.257** 0.472*** 0.274 0.379*** -0.269*** 0.184*** 0.376** 0.454***
(0.104) (0.0290) (0.209) (0.0672) (0.0870) (0.0436) (0.162) (0.113)
Observations 2,977 50,219 990 11,286 2,825 49,995 990 11,026
IV Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak IV test stat. 51.62 283.3 27.04 105.4 - 269.3 26.49 112.3
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2 level. The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to the Table 1.
Controls included the following variables: c. Gender, c. Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in Tuition Fees, c.
Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis of weak identification.
Table 8: Convergence of Political Opinion and Centrality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Diff. in Political Opinion (March 2014)
Centrality measure: Eigenvector centrality Betweenness centrality
Sub-samples: Two 90th Stars One 90th Star No 90th Star Two 90th Stars One 90th Star No 90th Star
Undirected Friendship 0.0571 -0.323 -0.155 -0.299 -0.359 -0.115***
(0.249) (0.276) (0.122) (0.867) (0.220) (0.0444)
Observations 666 11,508 48,342 555 10,605 49,356
IV Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group Same Group
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
WeakIV test stat. 49.59 50.03 244.0 25.33 91.42 254.7
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group of individual 2 level. The prefix ”c.” in front of
certain variables signifies a dummy variable that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the same for both students in the pair. The
sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to the Table 1. Controls included the following variables: c. Gender, c.
Nationality, c. Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in Tuition Fees, c. Parents Profession,
c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared under the null hypothesis
of weak identification.
Table 9: Convergence by Shortest Path
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Diff. in Political Opinion (March 2014)
Undirected Friendship -0.155*** - - - -
(0.0431)
Shortest Path - 0.0394*** - - -
(0.00989)
1st vs 2nd order only - - 0.134** - -
(0.0559)
2nd vs 3rd order only - - - -0.0206 -
(0.0934)
3rd vs more order only - - - - -0.160
(0.328)
Observations 60,516 60,516 6,921 29,958 53,595
IV Same Group and Interactions
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak IV test stat. 299.2 282.1 503.7 229.7 12.99
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group of individual 1 and at the group
of individual 2 level. The prefix ”c.” in front of certain variables signifies a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 iff the corresponding variable is the same for both students
in the pair. The sample used is the benchmark sample described in the footnote to
the Table 1. Controls included the following variables: c. Gender, c. Nationality, c.
Admission, c. Honour Graduation (High School), c. District of High School, Diff. in
Tuition Fees, c. Parents Profession, c. ZIP Code. Weak IV stat reports the Kleibergen-
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Figure 2: Convergence Coefficient in Political Opinion by Deciles of the Propen-
sity Score of Friendship.
Figure 3: Convergence Coefficient in Political Opinion by the Pair’s Original
Political Opinion.
Appendix Tables
Table A1 - Individual Characteristics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Very high social status 0.670 (0.471)
High social status 0.124 (0.330)
Average social status 0.0817 (0.274)
Low social status 0.0879 (0.283)
Social status unknown 0.0138 (0.117)
Median annual income 85336 -
Gender 0.592 (0.492)
Highest honor at high school exam 0.754 (0.431)
Foreigner 0.0704 (0.256)
Dual nationalities 0.133 (0.340)
Affirmative action recipient 0.198 (0.399)
Dual major in math 0.0477 (0.213)
Dual major in humanities 0.144 (0.352)
Dual major in sciences 0.0465 (0.211)
Dual major in African studies 0.0666 (0.249)
Notes: Summary statistics are computed on the full sample.
Survey instructions



